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Perceptions and Labor Market Outcomes of Immigrants in 
Australia after 9/11 
 
I examine whether after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Muslim immigrants and 
immigrants who fit the Muslim Arab stereotype in Australia perceive a greater increase in 
religious and racial intolerance and discrimination compared to other immigrant groups. I also 
examine whether there is a differential change in their labor market outcomes. I find that after 
9/11 there is a greater increase in the likelihood of Muslim men and of those who look like 
Muslims to report a lot of religious and racial intolerance and discrimination relative to other 
immigrants. Further, I do not find evidence that after 9/11 Muslims or their stereotypes show 
a differential change in the likelihood of looking for a new main job or of being employed. 
There is also no evidence of a differential change in hours worked or in wage incomes. This 
suggests that the Australian labor market did not react to attitudinal changes in society, at 
least in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. 
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 1 Introduction
The repercussions of the attacks in the United States on September 11, 20011 were felt
worldwide. Immediately following 9/11 strikes on Muslims were reported from various parts
of the world. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports a seventeen-fold increase in anti-
Muslim crimes in the U.S. during 2001 (Human Rights Watch 2002). In the ￿rst nine weeks
following the attacks the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee reports over 700
violent incidents targeting Arab Americans, or those perceived to be Arab Americans, Arabs
and Muslims (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 2003). The backlash of 9/11
was not con￿ned to one nationality or religion, rather it targeted victims based on their
perceived race, nationality, or religion. In the U.S., instances of hate violence included
attacks on Sikhs and Indian-Americans (Human Rights Watch 2002 and American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee 2003). Targeting of Muslims and those who ￿t the Muslim
stereotype spread beyond the United States. The Summary Report on Islamophobia in the
EU (Allen and Nielsen 2002) notes a hardening of hostilities in the aftermath of September
11, 2001 towards Muslims in many EU countries, especially towards Muslim women and
those who look of Muslim or Arab descent. BBC news reports that a mosque was destroyed
in Brisbane, Australia in an apparent retaliation for the U.S. terror attacks and that other
mosques were daubed with anti-Muslim gra¢ ti (BBC 2001). All this suggests that 9/11 led
to a surfacing of antagonistic attitudes towards the Muslim population, and towards those
who look like Muslims, in many parts of the world.
In this paper I examine whether after 9/11 immigrants to Australia who are Muslim or
who look of Muslim or Arab descent undergo a greater change in their perceptions about
religious and racial intolerance and discrimination compared to other immigrant groups.2
If, as suggested above, there was a widespread increase in hostilities towards Muslims and
their stereotypes, then, it is likely that the targeted groups would report a greater increase
1In the paper I sometimes refer to September 11, 2001 as 9/11.
2I sometimes refer to those who look of Muslim or Arab descent as ￿ Muslim-like￿ . I also refer to Muslim
and Muslim-like immigrants as the ￿ targeted groups￿ .
1in religious and racial intolerance and discrimination around them compared to other im-
migrants. I also examine if after 9/11 there was a di⁄erential change in the labor market
behavior and outcomes of the targeted groups relative to other immigrants. Australia is
one of the traditional settlement countries for international immigrants. In 2000 it attracted
an in￿ ow of 92.3 thousand permanent immigrants (OECD 2002) and in 2006 this number
rose to 191.9 thousand (OECD 2008). An understanding of the e⁄ects of events like 9/11
on recent immigrants is important for both the immigrant cohorts of the future as well as
for Australian policy makers, particularly if Australia is looking at immigration ￿ ows as a
means to tackle skill shortages in its labor market.
There are other studies that have tried to identify the e⁄ects of 9/11 on labor market
outcomes of targeted groups. Davila and Mora (2005) study if the relative wages of certain
groups that may be adversely a⁄ected by discrimination declined between 2000 and 2002 in
the United States. They ￿nd a more than 20 percent decline in the relative wages of Middle
Eastern Arab men, little change in the relative wages of Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani
men, and an improvement in relative wages of African Arab men. Kaushal, Kaestner, and
Cordelia (2007) examine whether the September 11, 2001 attacks had any e⁄ect on employ-
ment, earnings, and residential mobility of ￿rst- and second- generation Arab and Muslim
men in the United States. They ￿nd a 9-11 percent decline in the real wage and weekly
earnings of these groups as well as reduced intrastate migration by these groups as a result
of the terrorists￿attacks. Gathering support from various o¢ cial reports, Aslund and Rooth
(2005) provide some evidence that after 9/11 attitudes in Sweden were more hostile towards
immigrants from Africa and Middle East, presumably since these regions have a substantial
Muslim population. However, using data on the entire Swedish working age population when
they look at unemployment exit around 9/11, they do not ￿nd any evidence of increased
discrimination against these minorities. They conclude that a possible explanation for their
result could be that employers act rationally in their hiring decisions and do not respond
to changes in attitudes. In this paper using a nationally representative micro survey I ￿rst
2examine whether the attacks of September 11, 2001 have a greater e⁄ect on the perceptions
of targeted groups concerning racial and religious intolerance and discrimination in Australia
relative to other groups. Such an e⁄ect would be a re￿ ection of changes in attitudes of society
towards these groups. Next, I examine whether e⁄ects on perceptions are accompanied by
e⁄ects in the labor market. This paper thus relates to literature that examines the link be-
tween peoples￿preconceptions and labor market discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan
2004; Darity and Mason 1998).
I use the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, LSIA, and adopt a di⁄erence in
di⁄erences approach where identi￿cation comes from the timing of survey interviews. I ￿nd
evidence to show that after 9/11 Muslim men and immigrants who look like Muslims have an
increased likelihood of reporting a lot of religious and racial intolerance and discrimination in
Australia relative to other immigrants. However, I do not ￿nd any evidence of a di⁄erential
change in the labor market behavior and outcomes of Muslim or Muslim-like immigrants
relative to other immigrant groups.
Section 2 explains the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4
presents the empirical results and section 5 gives the conclusions.
2 Empirical Framework
2.1 Methodology
The timing of interviews in the dataset is used to identify whether after 9/11 perceived
discrimination grew faster among Muslim immigrants than among non-Muslims. The immi-
grants in the survey are interviewed twice. The ￿rst wave, wave1, of interviews is conducted
approximately ￿ve months after arrival, and the second wave, wave2, about eighteen months
after arrival.3 Each wave of interviews occurs over a one year period. In the sample the ear-
3The average time to wave1 interview since arrival is 5.1 months. The standard deviation is 1.2 months
and sample size is 3598. The average time to wave2 interview since arrival is 17.5 months. The standard
deviation is 1.1 months and sample size is 3591.
3liest wave2 interview is conducted on February 28, 2001 and the last interview on February
28, 2002. September 11, 2001 therefore divides the wave2 interview period such that 0.53 of
the period lies before it and 0.47 after. This helps in identifying the causal e⁄ects of 9/11
for the outcomes I study.
I use the following di⁄erence in di⁄erences approach,
yi = ￿0 + ￿1Muslimi +￿2Post911i + ￿3(Muslimi ￿Post911i) + Xi￿ + "i (1)
where yi is a binary dummy that captures individual i￿ s perception of religious/racial intoler-
ance/discrimination at the time of wave2. Muslimi and Post911i are dummies for whether
or not the individual is a Muslim and whether or not the wave2 interview was conducted
after September 11, 2001, respectively. Xi is a set of controls for individual characteristics
like sex, age, education, visa status, country of birth, state of residence etc. "i stands for
all unobservable factors that a⁄ect an individual￿ s perception. Thus, ￿3 is a di⁄erence in
di⁄erences estimator (Blundell and Dias (2008) and Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen
(2004) provide a good discussion of the di⁄erence in di⁄erences estimation approach). ￿3 is
identi￿ed through variation in average perception between Muslims and non-Muslims before
9/11, and comparison of this di⁄erence with variation in average perception between the
same two groups after 9/11. When analyzing perceptions on religious and racial intolerance
and discrimination I estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression, SUR, system to be able
to carry out joint signi￿cance test of the interaction terms for the four related variables on
perceptions.
If after September 11 Muslim immigrants perceive a greater increase in racial and religious
intolerance and discrimination compared to non-Muslim immigrants, then, the interaction
term, Muslim￿Post911 should be positive and statistically signi￿cant. The underlying
hypothesis in looking at the interaction term is that after 9/11 targeted groups, Muslims
in this case, will report greater increase in discrimination levels compared to non-targeted
4groups. If after 9/11 all immigrants, irrespective of being targeted or not, perceive and
report equally higher levels of discrimination in society, then only the Post911 variable will
be statistically signi￿cant.
I also look at whether after 9/11 relative to other immigrants Muslim immigrants have a
di⁄erential likelihood to look for a change in their main jobs4 and to be employed conditional
on having been employed in wave1. I also examine whether they have a di⁄erential change
in hours worked in their main job and in income from wages and salaries. To look at these
labor market outcomes I estimate an equation similar to equation (1), where yi stands for
the relevant outcome being studied.
In all cases above, I also estimate the equations by replacing the Muslim dummy with
a Muslim-like dummy. The Muslim-like dummy takes the value 1 for immigrants from
the Middle East, except Israel, and for immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and
Bangladesh. People who fall in the Muslim-like category may not be Muslims but they ￿t
the media enforced stereotype of an Arab or Middle Eastern Muslim. Using the Muslim-like
variable captures any e⁄ects of 9/11 on attitudes and behavior that are expressed on the
basis of stereotypes of Muslims or Arabs.
Finally, it should be noted that all immigrants in the sample arrive before September 11,
2001 and therefore the interaction coe¢ cient is not biased due to selection at the time of
granting entry into Australia.
2.2 Timeline of events
One potential cause for concern is that there could be other incidents that happened around
September 11, 2001 and that had di⁄erent e⁄ects on targeted and non-targeted groups, that
are driving the results on the interaction term in equation (1). To see if this is the case, I
look at the history of major events that may have a⁄ected Australia between March 2001
and February 2002, the period when the second wave of interviews was conducted.
4Main job is de￿ned as the one in which the immigrant works the maximum number of hours per week.
5In May 2001, churches rebuked Prime Minister John Howard for failing to properly ac-
knowledge the su⁄erings of thousands of Aborigines under past assimilation policy. However,
it is unlikely that this event in￿ uenced the perceptions and outcomes of targeted groups any
di⁄erently from the rest, and even more unlikely that it a⁄ected them di⁄erently after 9/11.
On 26th August 2001, a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa, rescued around 450 asylum
seekers, most of them Afghans, from a sinking ferry in Australian waters. The Australian
government refused to grant entry to these so called boat people and Australia￿ s tough
stance was criticized by the United Nations and various human rights groups. Although this
particular incident happened close to 9/11, and most of the asylum seekers were probably
Muslims, Australia had been following a tough stance towards all those who arrived illegally
to its shores for many years. Australia￿ s policy of mandatory detention, whereby anyone
arriving without visas or passports and claiming refugee status is automatically locked away
while their application is being investigated, has been in place since 1992. Since Australia
consistently held a strict position on illegal immigrants long before September 11, 2001, I
do not think that the ￿ Tampa boat people￿incident, although widely publicized, biases the
interaction term between Muslim and Post911 in my estimations.
The conservative Prime Minister, John Howard, won a third term in November 2001, and
some say that this was largely due to strict new measures against boat people and illegal
immigrants. In fact, some of these new measures and further tightening of policies towards
asylum seekers were a reaction to 9/11. In an interview following 9/11, as a response to why
there are detention centers in Australia for illegal migrants, the then Immigration Minister,
Philip Ruddock, gave the following reply, "We have security issues, which have assumed
far more importance now, post the tragic events in USA ...". Thus, if the more stringent
measures against illegal arrivals were adopted because of increased security concerns felt
after 9/11, then, the interaction coe¢ cient would be rightly picking up this e⁄ect.5
5The night-club bombing in Bali, Indonesia, which some refer to as Australia￿ s September 11, happened
in October 2002. The second wave of interviews was completed in February 2002 and therefore the Bali
bombing does not in￿ uence this study.
6Finally, I control for interviews conducted in the month of Ramadan. Ramadan is a
Muslim religious observance that takes place during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar.
In 2001, Ramadan was observed between November 16 and December 15. It is considered
the most venerated and blessed month of the Islamic year. Prayers, fasting, charity, and self-
accountability are especially stressed at this time. Thus, during this month of self-re￿ ection
and religious observances, the perceptions of Muslims may be a⁄ected and at the same time
they may stand out as a group.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
I use the second cohort of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, LSIA, under-
taken by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
A⁄airs. The sampling unit of the LSIA is the Primary Applicant, PA. The PA is the per-
son upon whom the approval to immigrate was based. The LSIA represents all PAs aged
15 years and over, who arrived in Australia as o⁄shore visaed immigrants in the one year
period September 1999 to August 2000.6 The group of persons who immigrate as part of the
PA￿ s visa application are known as the Migrating Unit, MU. To increase the sample size, I
also include MU spouses in the analysis. As mentioned earlier, LSIA has two data collection
waves, i.e. immigrants were interviewed twice. Wave1 covers the period prior to arrival
and approximately the ￿rst six months since migration, while wave2 covers the period six
to eighteen months after migration. The wave1 sample consists of 3124 PAs and 1094 MU
spouses. Due to sample attrition between the waves, wave2 consists of 2649 PAs and 942
MU spouses.
According to the 2001 Census, Christians constitute the largest religious group, compris-
ing 68 percent of the total Australian population. Muslims constitute 1.5 percent. Compared
to their share in total Australian population, Muslims constitute a larger share of the LSIA
immigrant cohort, 11.8 percent.
6The size of the population that LSIA represents is around 32,500 PAs.
7Table 1 presents some characteristics of the LSIA immigrant cohort at wave2. About 12
percent is Muslim. Although September 11, 2001 divides the wave2 interview period such
that 0.53 of the interview period falls before that date and 0.47 after, only 26 percent of
the wave2 interviews are carried out after 9/11. Thus, interviews are not uniformly spaced
and a larger share of interviews is conducted before 9/11.7 Only 2 percent of the immigrant
cohort at wave2 (approximately 70 observations) is Muslim and is interviewed after 9/11.
The Muslim-like group, namely immigrants from the Middle East, except Israel, and from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh constitutes about 19 percent of the cohort.
About 4 percent (approximately 140 observations) is Muslim-like and is interviewed after
9/11. At wave2, 43 percent of the new immigrants have a Bachelor￿ s or higher degree and
50 percent are on skilled visas. Immigrants from United Kingdom, China and India together
comprise 35 percent of the LSIA immigrant cohort at wave2. At wave 2, 59 percent of the
immigrant cohort is employed.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the questions, as worded in the LSIA questionnaire, on
impressions of immigrants regarding religious and racial tolerance and discrimination in
Australia at the time of wave2 interview. Responses to these questions are used to create
the dependent variables concerning perceptions and are described in Panel B of table 2. A
striking observation when comparing answers on perceptions of tolerance versus discrimina-
tion in Australia is that more people choose to give a categorical response when asked about
tolerance, and a larger share of these responses is extreme. For example, there were 186 more
responses for the question on religious tolerance compared to the one on religious discrimi-
nation and, conditional on a response, 9 percent felt that there was little religious tolerance
in Australia, while only 3 percent felt that there was a lot of religious discrimination.
7In my estimations I control for months spent in the host country, which may vary quite a bit across
the sample because of non-uniformly spaced interviews. On an average the time between wave1 and wave2
interviews is 12.4 months with a standard deviation of 1.1 months and a sample size of 3591
84 Results
4.1 Perceptions
Tables 3 and 4 present the SUR estimation results for the four responses on religious and
racial perceptions. I use SUR to estimate a linear probability model where the sample
includes only immigrants who gave all four responses.8 Table 3 includes the interaction
of Post 9/11 with the Muslim dummy, while Table 4 does the same with the Muslim-like
dummy.
In table 3 the coe¢ cient on Post 9/11 is positive and signi￿cant in all cases except
religious intolerance. In the latter case it is negative but the magnitude is small and it is
not statistically signi￿cant. Further the interaction between Muslim and Post 9/11 is always
positive. This suggests that after 9/11 all immigrant groups were more likely to report that
there was little racial tolerance and a lot of religious and racial discrimination compared
to their perception before 9/11. For example in case of racial intolerance (column 3) after
9/11 the probability of reporting high level of racial intolerance in society increased by 8.7
percentage points among non-Muslims and it increased by 10.5 (8.7+1.8) percentage points
among Muslims.
Again in table 4 the Post 9/11 dummy is positive and signi￿cant in all cases except
religious intolerance. In the latter case it is negative but not statistically signi￿cant. Also
the interaction between Muslim-like and Post 9/11 is positive for all four responses. This
once again suggests that after 9/11 all immigrant groups were more likely to report that
there was little racial tolerance and a lot of religious and racial discrimination compared to
their perception before 9/11. Further, since the interaction term between Muslim-like and
Post 9/11 is also statistically signi￿cant at the one percent level for religious intolerance
and religious discrimination, Muslim-like immigrants perceive greater increase after 9/11 in
religious intolerance and discrimination relative to non Muslim-like immigrants. For example,
8The Bruesch and Pagan test of independence is rejected.
9before 9/11 a Muslim-like immigrant is 8.1 percentage points less likely to report a high level
of religious intolerance compared to a non-Muslim-like immigrant. However after 9/11, a
Muslim-like immigrant is 5.2 (-8.1+13.3) percentage points more likely to report a high level
of religious intolerance compared to a non-Muslim-like immigrant.
In drawing conclusions from tables 3 and 4 it is important to test the joint signi￿cance
of the four interaction terms in each table. The results for these tests are shown in table 5.
The null hypothesis is that each of the four interaction terms is equal to zero, i.e. after 9/11
the change in the perceptions of Muslim or Muslim-like immigrants is no di⁄erent compared
to the change for non-Muslim or non-Muslim-like immigrant groups, respectively. The chi2
test is against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the coe¢ cients is not equal to
zero. The more relevant alternative is that at least one of the coe¢ cients is greater than
zero; therefore, this test is more conservative in rejecting the null hypothesis. I cannot reject
the null that the interaction terms are jointly insigni￿cant for the Muslim case in table 3,
while I reject the null of joint insigni￿cance for the Muslim-like case in table 4.
Therefore, table 4 provides evidence to show that after 9/11 there was greater perceived
increase in religious and racial intolerance and discrimination among immigrants who ￿t the
Muslim-Arab stereotype compared to other immigrant groups.
4.1.1 Robustness checks
Table 4 provides evidence to suggest that 9/11 had greater impact on perceptions of Muslim-
like immigrants regarding religious and racial intolerance and discrimination around them
relative to those who do not ￿t the Muslim or Arab stereotype. However, one needs to check
if this result is solely driven by the September 2001 attacks or did other events around 9/11
in￿ uence peoples￿perceptions.9 Two robustness checks are discussed below and the results
9There are not enough interviews between August 26, 2001, the day of the Tampa boat incident, and
September 11, 2001, to be able to separate the e⁄ects of the Tampa boat incident from those of 9/11. Also
for reasons mentioned in section 2.2, I do not expect that the Tampa boat incident had a di⁄erent impact
on perceptions of Muslim-like immigrants compared to other immigrants.
10are shown in table 6.
1. Narrowing window around 9/11
I restrict the sample to a narrow window before and after 9/11 to see if the results
are in￿ uenced by other events besides 9/11. If 9/11 is entirely driving the results, the
coe¢ cients on the interaction terms should be similar in magnitude to those in table 4 even
though standard errors may be larger due to the reduced sample size. Panel A of table 6
shows the results for Muslim-like immigrants where only immigrants interviewed in the three
months before and after September 11 are included in the estimation. The magnitudes of the
interaction coe¢ cients are similar and in some cases are larger than corresponding coe¢ cients
in table 4, except for racial discrimination variable. The magnitude is much smaller for racial
discrimination compared to table 4, but this coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant in table
4. I conclude that the greater change in perceptions of Muslim-like immigrants after 9/11
regarding religious discrimination and religious intolerance is robust to this test.
2. June 5 cuto⁄
I use only those interviews conducted before September 11, 2001, and split this wave2
sample in half by choosing June 5 as the midpoint. I re-estimate the SUR speci￿cation
in table 4 using a Post June 5 dummy instead of a Post 9/11 dummy. If the events of
9/11 are solely driving the results the interaction coe¢ cients should not be signi￿cant in this
speci￿cation. Panel B of table 6 presents the results of this exercise. For religious intolerance
and discrimination and for racial intolerance the interaction terms are not signi￿cant at
the ￿ve percent level. In column 4, the interaction term is positive and has a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on perceptions concerning racial discrimination of Muslim-like immigrants after June
5 relative to all immigrants before June 5. The chi2 test of joint insigni￿cance is rejected
at the ￿ve percent level but not at the one percent level.10 However, as mentioned earlier
10Under the chi2 test for joint insigni￿cance of the interaction terms, the chi2 statistic is 12.94 and the
Prob > chi2 is 0.0116.
11given the nature of the alternative hypothesis this test is conservative in rejecting the null
hypothesis. Also, some coe¢ cients have opposite signs and therefore it is di¢ cult to interpret
this inference test.
Overall, the ￿rst robustness check of narrowing the window around 9/11 supports the
￿nding in table 4 that after 9/11 those who appear Muslim are more likely to report greater
discrimination and intolerance in Australia relative to other immigrant groups. Although
the second robustness check does not provide strong evidence to support that it is the events
around 9/11 that are solely driving this ￿nding, at the same time it does not contradict table
4.
4.1.2 Non-response bias
In all the estimations above an observation is included in the sample only when the individual
gives a categorical response to the question being asked. If the immigrant chooses to answer,
￿ No opinion￿ , which is also an option in the survey questionnaire, the observation is dropped
from the regression. This can bias the coe¢ cients if individuals who have an extreme opinion
fear to state it and instead choose not to say anything at all. Table 7 examines whether
non-response bias is a concern for the estimations so far. I once again estimate a SUR using
the same speci￿cation as tables 3 and 4. Conditional on being interviewed the dependent
variables take the value 1 when the immigrant chooses ￿ No opinion￿and 0 otherwise.
Panel A of table 7 shows that the interaction between Muslim and Post 9/11 is positive
for all four responses but is never statistically signi￿cant.11 Panel B of table 7 tests for non
response among the Muslim-like. It shows that after 9/11 Muslim-like immigrants show a
statistically signi￿cant increase in non-response concerning their perceptions compared to
other immigrants. The chi2 test of joint insigni￿cance of the interaction terms is rejected
under the alternate hypothesis of at least one coe¢ cient being non-zero.12
11The chi2 test of joint insigni￿cance against the alternative that at least one coe¢ cient is non-zero, cannot
be rejected. The chi2 statistic is 4.05 and the Prob > chi2 is 0.3988.
12The chi2 statistic is 13.58 and Prob > chi2 is 0.0088.
12Looking at the covariates in table 7, women and those who are not ￿ uent in English are
also more likely to not give an opinion relative to men and those who can speak English well,
respectively.
In sum, relative to other groups there is evidence of signi￿cantly higher non-response
after 9/11 among those who look like Muslims or Arabs when reporting their perceptions
on religious and racial intolerance and discrimination. LSIA data is collected using in-depth
personal interviews and it is not surprising that the targeted group chooses not to respond
to sensitive questions. I expect that non-response among the targeted group biases results
downwards.
4.1.3 Di⁄erences by gender
Muslim women, especially those wearing the burqha, may be more conspicuous compared
to Muslim men because of their dress. They are therefore more likely to become targets
of anti-Muslim attitudes and they may also feel more threatened in the wake of violence
against Muslims following 9/11. To examine if this is the case I re-estimate tables 3 and 4
by separating the sample according to gender. The results are shown in table 8.
In the sample of males, the interaction terms are positive in all four cases and the hy-
pothesis that they are jointly insigni￿cant is rejected.13 For women, the coe¢ cients on the
interaction terms are in some cases larger than those for men, but the test for joint insigni￿-
cance is not rejected. The results for women may su⁄er from non-response bias as women are
more likely to su⁄er from non-response as seen in table 7. Also, the chi2 test is conservative
in rejecting the null hypothesis.
13For the interaction terms between Muslim and Post 9/11, the chi2 statistic is 13.38 and Prob > chi2 is
0.0096. For the interaction terms between Muslim-like and Post 9/11, the chi2 statistic is 23.08 and Prob >
chi2 is 0.0001.
134.2 Labor Market Behavior and Outcomes
The above analysis presents evidence that after 9/11 Muslim men and Muslim-like immi-
grants show a greater increase in their perceptions concerning religious and racial intolerance
and discrimination relative to non-Muslim men and non-Muslim-like immigrants respectively.
Given this ￿nding, I next examine if this di⁄erential change in perceptions is concurrent with
a di⁄erential change in their labor market behavior and outcomes.
4.2.1 Search for a Change in Main Job
Among the recent immigrant cohort 23 percent of those having a job at the time of wave2
interview were looking for a change in their main job. Tables 9 and 10 respectively show
the results for whether Muslims and Muslim-like immigrants show an increased likelihood of
looking for a new main job after 9/11 compared to other immigrants. This may be the case
if after 9/11 they are more likely to be dissatis￿ed with their work environment compared to
other immigrant groups. On the other hand, targeted groups may show a decreased tendency
for job change if they feel that their job prospects have been more adversely a⁄ected compared
to other groups.
Conditional on being employed at wave2 interview, the dependent variable takes the value
1 if the immigrant reports that he is searching for a new main job and 0 otherwise. The
tables report linear probability model coe¢ cients. In column 2, I additionally control for
whether the current main job was found using the immigrant￿ s social network, i.e. through
family or friends and in column 3 I also include controls for occupation. Surprisingly, the
interaction terms between Muslim/Muslim-like and Post 9/11 have opposite signs. Table
9 shows that the interaction between Muslim and Post 9/11 is positive and insigni￿cant
in all speci￿cations. However, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is not trivial. Before 9/11
Muslims are 9 percentage points less likely to be looking for a change in main job compared
to non-Muslims, whereas after 9/11 Muslims are 5 (-9.2+13.9) percentage points more likely
to do so compared to non-Muslims. Table 10 shows that the interaction between Muslim-
14like and Post 9/11 is negative and is signi￿cant at the ten percent level in column 3. Before
9/11 Muslim-like immigrants are 13 percentage points less likely to be looking for a change
in main job compared to non-Muslim-like immigrants (this is not statistically signi￿cant),
while after 9/11 they are 30 (13.2+16.6) percentage points less likely to do so compared to
non-Muslim-like immigrants.
Thus, for Muslim or for Muslim-like immigrants there is no evidence of di⁄erential job
search behaviour after 9/11 compared to other immigrant groups.
4.2.2 Employment Status
59 percent of the recent immigrant cohort is employed at wave 2 interview. Table 11 shows
whether there is a di⁄erential change in the likelihood of being employed for Muslims and
Muslim-like immigrants after 9/11 compared to other immigrant groups. One would expect
to see a greater decrease in employment rates of targeted groups if after 9/11 they face
higher rates of being ￿red from their jobs and/or lower rates of being recruited into new
jobs. Conditional on being employed at wave1 interview, the dependent variable takes the
value 1 if the immigrant is employed at wave2 interview and 0 otherwise. The table reports
linear probability model coe¢ cients. The interaction between Muslim and Post 9/11 and
that between Muslim-like and Post 9/11 are both positive but never statistically signi￿cant.
Thus, there is no evidence of lower employment rates after 9/11 for Muslims or Muslim-
like groups compared to other immigrant groups.
4.2.3 Hours Worked per Week in Main Job
On an average a recent immigrant works for about 38 hours per week in his main job. Table
12 examines whether after 9/11 there is a di⁄erential change in this variable for Muslims
or Muslim-like immigrants compared to other groups. Table 12 presents the results for an
OLS where the dependent variable is hours worked per week in the main job, conditional on
having a job. In columns 2 and 4 I additionally control for occupation.
15Column 1 shows that before 9/11 Muslims work 6 hours less per week in their main jobs
compared to other immigrant groups, but after 9/11 they work almost the same number of
hours as other immigrants (-6.03+5.74), although the interaction term is not statistically
signi￿cant.
Column 3 shows that before 9/11 Muslim-like immigrants work 1.5 hours more per week in
their main jobs compared to other immigrant groups (this is not statistically signi￿cant), but
after 9/11 they work 6 (1.5+4.5) hours more per week compared to other immigrant groups
(again the interaction between Muslim-like and Post 9/11 is not statistically signi￿cant).
Once again, there is no evidence of a di⁄erential change in hours worked after 9/11 for
Muslims or Muslim-like groups compared to other immigrants.14
4.2.4 Income from Wages
LSIA captures income per week from wages and salaries but the information is interval coded.
The modal weekly income from wages and salaries is 1230.5 Australian dollars. In table 13
I present the results of an ordered probit regression where the latent variable is logarithm
of wages. In columns 2 and 4 I control for occupation. Column 2 shows that before 9/11
Muslim immigrants earn 22 percent lower wages than non-Muslim immigrants while after
9/11 they earn 26 percent lower wages. Similarly, column 4 shows that before 9/11 Muslim-
like immigrants earn 21 percent higher wages compared to non-Muslim like immigrants, while
after 9/11 they earn 19 percent higher wages. The interaction term between Muslim/Muslim-
like and Post 9/11 is never statistically signi￿cant. Thus, there is no evidence of di⁄erential
change in wage income after 9/11 for these groups compared to other immigrants.
The coe¢ cients for Post 9/11 are negative and are statistically signi￿cant in all cases
except column 4. When I control for occupation the coe¢ cient increases. This suggests that
14In column 4 when I control for occupation there an increase of 1.3 hours per week in the magnitude
of the interaction coe¢ cient for Muslims and there is small decrease of 0.7 hours per week for Muslim-like
immigrants. This suggests that after 9/11 Muslims show a greater tendency to be in occupations that entail
smaller work hours while Muslim-like immigrants show a greater tendency to be in occupations that have
more work hours.
16after 9/11 people moved to occupations that paid lower wages.
In conclusion, the results in tables 9 to 13 show that 9/11 did not have any di⁄erential
e⁄ects on the labor market behavior and outcomes of the targeted groups relative to other
immigrant groups. This conforms with the ￿nding in Aslund and Rooth (2005) for Swe-
den where they do not ￿nd any evidence of increased labor market discrimination against
minorities in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks.
4.3 Attrition bias
Finally, if Muslims or other immigrants most a⁄ected by the events of 9/11 were not inter-
viewed post September 11, i.e. if there was higher attrition among the targeted groups after
9/11 relative to others, then, this may bias the results seen so far. Table 14 investigates this
possibility. It shows the reasons for attrition between the two waves for the PAs who are the
sampling units in LSIA. The ￿rst column gives this information for the full sample. About
14 percent of the wave1 sample is not interviewed in wave2. Columns 2 and 3 show that both
the Muslim and non-Muslim groups have about 14 percent attrition between waves. Simi-
larly columns 4 and 5 show that while the attrition rate was 7 percent for the Muslim-like
group, it was about 16 percent for the non-Muslim-like population.
To investigate this further, the left hand side of table 15 shows the sample fractions for a
cross tabulation between religious identity and whether the wave2 interview was conducted
in the pre- or post- September 11, 2001 interview period. The right hand side shows the
same information for the wave1 sample, using August 16, 2000 as the cut o⁄, because it
divides the wave1 interview period in exactly the same proportion as September 11 divides
the wave2 period.15 The top panel shows that there is a one percentage point drop in the
share of Muslim immigrants in the post-9/11 interview period compared to their share in
the corresponding wave1 period (from 3 percent in wave1 to 2 percent in wave2). The lower
15September 11, 2001 divides the wave2 interview period such that 0.53 of the period lies before it and
0.47 after. August 16, 2000 divides the wave1 interview period in exactly this proportion.
17panel shows that the share of Muslim-like immigrants interviewed after 9/11 remained the
same as their share in the corresponding wave1 period (6 percent in both cases). Thus, for
the Muslim population there is some evidence of attrition bias which I suspect would bias
the interaction term downwards. The cross tabulations do not suggest attrition bias for the
Muslim-like population.
In all the estimations I use wave2 weights designed by the LSIA to correct for attrition
bias. To the extent that these weights take account of attrition and that a key variable
in calculating these weights is country of origin which is correlated with being Muslim, my
estimates should not su⁄er from attrition bias.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I ￿rst examine whether after the September 11, 2001 bombings in the United
States there is a signi￿cantly di⁄erent change in the perceptions of Muslim immigrants to
Australia regarding religious and racial intolerance and discrimination relative to non-Muslim
immigrants. I also study whether this is the case for immigrants from the Middle East (except
Israel) and South Asia, who may not be Muslim, but, who ￿t the media enforced stereotype
of a Muslim or an Arab. I also examine whether after 9/11 there is a di⁄erential change in
the labor market behavior and outcomes of the targeted groups relative to other immigrants.
The labor market outcomes I analyze here are the likelihood of searching for a change in main
job, the likelihood of being employed, hours worked in main job and income from wages. I
use a nationally representative survey of immigrants to Australia and adopt a di⁄erence in
di⁄erences approach where identi￿cation comes from the timing of survey interviews around
9/11.
There is evidence to show that after 9/11 Muslim men and those who ￿t the Muslim Arab
stereotype perceive a greater increase in religious and racial intolerance and discrimination in
Australia relative to other immigrants. If such perceptions are based on real life experiences,
18then, this ￿nding suggests that relative to other immigrants, Muslim men and those who
can be typecast as Muslims or Arabs experienced greater discrimination in the months
immediately following 9/11.
Finally, for the labor market outcomes analyzed in this paper, I ￿nd no evidence of
di⁄erential change in these outcomes after 9/11 for Muslim or for Muslim-like immigrants
compared to other immigrant groups. Speci￿cally, there is no di⁄erential change in the
likelihood of looking for a new main job or of being employed. There is also no evidence of
di⁄erential change in hours worked or in wage incomes for the targeted groups. This suggests
that the Australian labor market did not respond to attitudinal changes in society, atleast
in the six month period following the September 2001 attacks in the United States.
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20Table 1: Characteristics of LSIA Immigrant Cohort at wave2
Fraction (std. dev) Sample size
Muslim 0.12 (0.32) 3598
Interview post 9/11, Post911 0.26 (0.43) 3591
Muslim*Post911 0.02 (0.15) 3591
Muslim-like1 0.19 (0.40) 3598
Muslim-like*Post911 0.04 (0.19) 3591
Sex 0.54 (0.50) 3591
Age in years 36.0 (10.5) 3591
Speak English well 0.77 (0.42) 3538
Principal applicant 0.76 (0.43) 3598
MU spouse present in household 0.48 (0.5) 3598
Children of PA in household, Kids 0.89 (1.08) 3598
Education
Bachelor￿ s and above 0.43 3528
Professional Certi￿cate 0.27 3528





Top 3 source countries of immigrants






Not in labor force 0.35 3538
Looking for a change in main job 0.22 1849
Hours worked per week in main job 37.6 (13.3) 1831
Modal value of weekly wage income2 1230.5 1737
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition
1. Muslim-like includes immigrants from Middle East (except Israel),
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
2. Mid point of modal weekly income interval, in Australian dollars.
21Table 2: Perceptions about living in Australia, at wave2
Panel A: Wording of questions on perception1
a. Do people in Australia display a lot of tolerance towards people of other religions,
some or only a little?
b. Is there a lot of religious discrimination in Australia, some or only a little?
c. Do people in Australia display a lot of tolerance towards people of other races, cultures
and countries, some or only a little?
d. Is there a lot of racial discrimination in Australia, some or only a little?
Panel B: Binary dependent variable(conditional on an opinion)
Variable Response Description Fraction Sample size
Religious intolerance 1=Little tolerance, 0=Some or Lot 0.09 3311
Religious discrimination 1=Lot, 0=Some or Little 0.03 3125
Racial intolerance 1=Little tolerance, 0=Some or Lot 0.09 3382
Racial discrimination 1=Lot, 0=Some or Little 0.04 3286
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition.
1. For each of these questions, the respondent could choose "No opinion".
22Table 3: Perceptions of Muslims after 9/11, SUR
Religious Religious Racial Racial
Dependent variable intolerance discrimination intolerance discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim 0.016 -0.007 -0.017 -0.007
[0.021] [0.011] [0.020] [0.014]
Post 911 -0.007 0.035** 0.087*** 0.068***
[0.028] [0.015] [0.028] [0.019]
Muslim*Post911 0.076* 0.025 0.018 0.054*
[0.045] [0.025] [0.045] [0.031]
Ramadan -0.016 0.010 -0.013 0.002
[0.025] [0.014] [0.025] [0.017]
Muslim*Ramadan -0.156* -0.040 0.051 0.016
[0.091] [0.050] [0.090] [0.061]
Female -0.000 0.016** -0.003 0.016**
[0.012] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008]
Age 0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Speak English well 0.034** -0.011 -0.060*** -0.038***
[0.017] [0.009] [0.017] [0.012]
Principal applicant -0.018 0.005 -0.010 0.037***
[0.016] [0.009] [0.016] [0.011]
MU spouse in hhld -0.005 -0.008 0.017 0.024**
[0.018] [0.010] [0.018] [0.012]
Kids 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
Months in Australia 0.009* -0.013*** -0.003 -0.006*
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Professional Cert. -0.003 0.024*** -0.026* -0.017*
[0.013] [0.007] [0.013] [0.009]
High school or less 0.028* -0.016* -0.021 -0.019*
[0.015] [0.008] [0.015] [0.010]
Family visa 0.043** 0.022** 0.056*** 0.024**
[0.018] [0.010] [0.017] [0.012]
Humanitarian visa 0.078*** 0.009 0.024 0.039**
[0.027] [0.015] [0.027] [0.018]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor force status Yes Yes Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2916 2916 2916 2916
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s and above
and Skilled visa are omitted categories for education and visa status. Standard
errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
23Table 4: Perceptions of Muslim like after 9/11, SUR
Religious Religious Racial Racial
Dependent variable intolerance discrimination intolerance discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim-like -0.081** 0.012 -0.087** -0.002
[0.034] [0.019] [0.034] [0.023]
Post 911 -0.025 0.026* 0.086*** 0.068***
[0.028] [0.016] [0.028] [0.019]
Muslim-like*Post911 0.133*** 0.073*** 0.029 0.034
[0.039] [0.021] [0.038] [0.026]
Ramadan 0.007 0.021 -0.012 -0.014
[0.027] [0.015] [0.026] [0.018]
Muslim-like*Ramadan -0.215*** -0.101*** 0.015 0.081*
[0.065] [0.036] [0.064] [0.044]
Female -0.004 0.016** -0.004 0.016**
[0.012] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008]
Age -0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Speak English well 0.030* -0.011 -0.063*** -0.038***
[0.017] [0.009] [0.017] [0.012]
Principal applicant -0.018 0.005 -0.010 0.037***
[0.016] [0.009] [0.016] [0.011]
MU spouse in hhld -0.006 -0.009 0.019 0.023*
[0.018] [0.010] [0.018] [0.012]
Kids 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
Months in Australia 0.010** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.006**
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Professional Cert. -0.004 0.024*** -0.028** -0.018**
[0.013] [0.007] [0.013] [0.009]
High school or less 0.027* -0.017** -0.023 -0.020*
[0.015] [0.008] [0.015] [0.010]
Family visa 0.044** 0.021** 0.057*** 0.025**
[0.017] [0.010] [0.017] [0.012]
Humanitarian visa 0.072*** 0.009 0.021 0.040**
[0.027] [0.015] [0.027] [0.018]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor force status Yes Yes Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2916 2916 2916 2916
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s and above
and Skilled visa are omitted categories for education and visa status. Standard
errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
24Table 5: Joint Signi￿cance test for Interaction terms in tables 3 and 4
Test for table 3
Null Hypothesis Muslim*Post 911 interaction terms are each equal to 0
chi2( 4), [Prob > chi2] 6.05, [0.1952]
Test for table 4
Null Hypothesis Muslim-like*Post 911 interaction terms are each equal to 0
chi2( 4), [Prob > chi2] 24.51, [0.0001]
Table 6: Robustness checks for Perceptions
Religious Religious Racial Racial
Dependent variable intolerance discrimination intolerance discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Narrowing window around 9/11, SUR
Muslim-like -0.160*** 0.006 -0.213*** 0.004
[0.043] [0.022] [0.040] [0.027]
Post 911 -0.009 -0.003 0.086*** 0.022
[0.035] [0.018] [0.032] [0.022]
Muslim-like*Post911 0.129*** 0.082*** 0.058 0.009
[0.046] [0.024] [0.043] [0.029]
Observations 1766 1766 1766 1766
Panel B: June 5 cuto⁄, SUR
Muslim-like -0.113*** 0.028 -0.090** -0.032
[0.042] [0.024] [0.043] [0.029]
Post June 5 0.046 -0.091*** -0.062* 0.054**
[0.034] [0.019] [0.035] [0.023]
Muslim-like*Post June 5 0.004 -0.026 -0.058* 0.044**
[0.030] [0.017] [0.031] [0.021]
Observations 1967 1967 1967 1967
Both tests include other control variables included in Table 4. Used weights that
correct for between wave attrition. Standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
25Table 7: Testing Non-response, SUR
Dependent variable: 1=Non-response, 0=De￿nitive response jconditional on interview
Religious Religious Racial Racial
Non-response in intolerance discrimination intolerance discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Interaction between Muslim and Post 9/11
Muslim -0.002 -0.025 0.024* 0.020
[0.015] [0.020] [0.012] [0.014]
Post 911 -0.010 -0.050* 0.060*** 0.028
[0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [0.019]
Muslim*Post911 0.052 0.023 0.041 0.028
[0.032] [0.043] [0.026] [0.029]
Ramadan -0.019 -0.002 -0.017 -0.019
[0.019] [0.025] [0.015] [0.017]
Muslim*Ramadan -0.033 -0.027 -0.026 -0.046
[0.069] [0.092] [0.056] [0.063]
Female 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.021*** 0.027***
[0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008]
Age 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Speak English well -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.046*** -0.087***
[0.012] [0.016] [0.010] [0.011]
Observations 3528 3528 3528 3528
Panel B: Interaction between Muslim-like and Post 9/11
Muslim-like -0.011 0.006 -0.028 -0.019
[0.025] [0.034] [0.021] [0.023]
Post 911 -0.018 -0.055** 0.053*** 0.021
[0.020] [0.027] [0.017] [0.019]
Muslim-like*Post911 0.080*** 0.073** 0.067*** 0.050*
[0.028] [0.037] [0.023] [0.026]
Ramadan -0.018 -0.009 -0.032* -0.015
[0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [0.018]
Muslim-like*Ramadan -0.045 0.002 0.043 -0.051
[0.047] [0.063] [0.038] [0.043]
Female 0.024*** 0.050*** 0.018** 0.025***
[0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008]
Age 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.001***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Speak English well -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.089***
[0.012] [0.016] [0.010] [0.011]
Observations 3528 3528 3528 3528
Includes other controls used in tables 3 and 4. Used weights that correct for
between wave attrition. Standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
26Table 8: Perceptions after 9/11 by gender, SUR
Religious Religious Racial Racial
Dependent variable intolerance discrimination intolerance discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Males
Muslim -0.007 -0.016 -0.032 -0.006
[0.029] [0.012] [0.027] [0.019]
Post 911 -0.055 0.009 -0.062 0.101***
[0.040] [0.017] [0.039] [0.026]
Muslim*Post911 0.188*** 0.008 0.022 0.080**
[0.062] [0.026] [0.060] [0.041]
Observations 1398 1398 1398 1398
Females
Muslim 0.041 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009
[0.029] [0.019] [0.030] [0.021]
Post 911 0.021 0.062** 0.214*** 0.028
[0.038] [0.025] [0.039] [0.027]
Muslim*Post911 -0.046 0.056 -0.003 0.025
[0.065] [0.042] [0.066] [0.045]
Observations 1518 1518 1518 1518
Males
Muslim-like -0.172*** 0.003 -0.168*** 0.003
[0.051] [0.021] [0.049] [0.033]
Post 911 -0.076* 0.006 -0.056 0.099***
[0.041] [0.017] [0.039] [0.027]
Muslim-like*Post911 0.227*** 0.042* 0.023 0.055
[0.053] [0.022] [0.051] [0.035]
Observations 1398 1398 1398 1398
Females
Muslim-like -0.016 0.007 -0.015 -0.012
[0.045] [0.029] [0.046] [0.032]
Post 911 0.011 0.047* 0.211*** 0.032
[0.039] [0.025] [0.039] [0.027]
Muslim-like*Post911 0.025 0.120*** 0.015 0.005
[0.055] [0.036] [0.056] [0.039]
Observations 1518 1518 1518 1518
Regressions include other control variables included in tables 3 and 4.
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Standard errors in
brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
27Table 9: Looking for a change of main job conditional on working, Linear Probability Model
Dep. Var: 1=Looking for another main job, 0=otherwise
(1) (2) (3)
Muslim -0.089 -0.091 -0.092
[0.069] [0.071] [0.069]
Post 911 -0.059 -0.066 -0.069
[0.068] [0.071] [0.069]
Muslim*Post911 0.137 0.137 0.139
[0.188] [0.190] [0.189]
Use Quali￿cation in Main Job 0.167*** 0.181*** 0.143***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.041]
Ramadan -0.024 -0.021 -0.022
[0.064] [0.067] [0.066]
Muslim*Ramadan 0.536*** 0.566*** 0.487**
[0.199] [0.202] [0.202]
Network Job -0.061* -0.073**
[0.032] [0.034]
Female -0.035 -0.044 -0.050
[0.031] [0.032] [0.034]
Age -0.005*** -0.005** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Speak English well 0.004 -0.006 -0.009
[0.053] [0.055] [0.056]
Principal applicant 0.035 0.033 0.043
[0.041] [0.042] [0.043]
MU spouse in hhld 0.008 0.013 0.000
[0.047] [0.048] [0.048]
Kids -0.000 -0.001 0.004
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Months in Australia -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Professional Cert. -0.079** -0.080** -0.095**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.040]
High School or Less 0.052 0.072 0.027
[0.047] [0.049] [0.054]
Family visa -0.021 -0.014 -0.031
[0.049] [0.051] [0.051]
Humanitarian visa -0.158** -0.152* -0.174**
[0.079] [0.080] [0.079]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No No Yes
Observations (R-squared) 1848 (0.08) 1782 (0.09) 1769 (0.11)
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s & above, Skilled visa are
omitted categories for education and visa status. Robust standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
28Table 10: Looking for a change of main job conditional on working, Linear Probability Model
Dep. Var: 1=Looking for another main job, 0=otherwise
(1) (2) (3)
Muslim like -0.125 -0.132 -0.132
[0.101] [0.100] [0.099]
Post 911 -0.043 -0.049 -0.050
[0.069] [0.071] [0.070]
Muslim like*Post911 -0.157 -0.160 -0.166*
[0.097] [0.099] [0.100]
Use Quali￿cation in Main Job 0.171*** 0.186*** 0.145***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.041]
Ramadan -0.016 -0.015 -0.013
[0.070] [0.073] [0.073]
Muslim like*Ramadan 0.241 0.258 0.220
[0.171] [0.175] [0.163]
Network Job -0.058* -0.071**
[0.032] [0.034]
Female -0.034 -0.043 -0.049
[0.031] [0.032] [0.035]
Age -0.005** -0.005** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Speak English well -0.002 -0.012 -0.016
[0.053] [0.056] [0.056]
Principal applicant 0.037 0.036 0.046
[0.042] [0.043] [0.044]
MU spouse in hhld 0.015 0.020 0.006
[0.047] [0.048] [0.048]
Kids -0.005 -0.007 -0.001
[0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
Months in Australia -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Professional Cert. -0.077** -0.078** -0.093**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.041]
High School or Less 0.050 0.069 0.021
[0.047] [0.050] [0.054]
Family visa -0.021 -0.014 -0.033
[0.049] [0.051] [0.051]
Humanitarian visa -0.174** -0.170** -0.193**
[0.078] [0.079] [0.077]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No No Yes
Observations (R-squared) 1848 (0.08) 1782 (0.08) 1769 (0.10)
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s & above, Skilled visa are
omitted categories for education and visa status. Robust standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
29Table 11: Employment status in wave 2 conditional on being employed in wave1
Dependent Variable: 1=Employed, 0=Not Employed
(1) (2)
Muslim 0.121 Muslim like -0.053
[0.086] [0.091]
Post 911 -0.006 Post 911 -0.019
[0.051] [0.052]
Muslim*Post911 0.134 Muslim like*Post911 0.134
[0.206] [0.119]
Ramadan -0.042* Ramadan -0.036
[0.022] [0.023]
Muslim*Ramadan -0.296 Muslim like*Ramadan -0.167
[0.192] [0.113]
Female 0.049** Female 0.046*
[0.024] [0.024]
Age -0.004** Age -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002]
Speak English well -0.008 Speak English well -0.008
[0.052] [0.052]
Principal applicant -0.045 Principal applicant -0.042
[0.034] [0.035]
MU spouse in hhld 0.053** MU spouse in hhld 0.055**
[0.026] [0.027]
Kids 0.006 Kids 0.006
[0.011] [0.011]
Months in Australia -0.011 Months in Australia -0.010
[0.011] [0.011]
Professional Cert. 0.013 Professional Cert. 0.012
[0.024] [0.025]
High School or Less -0.018 High School or Less -0.009
[0.035] [0.034]
Family visa 0.091*** Family visa 0.093***
[0.029] [0.028]
Humanitarian visa 0.286*** Humanitarian visa 0.291***
[0.101] [0.101]
Quarter of arrival Yes Quarter of arrival Yes
COB groups Yes COB groups Yes
Interview state Yes Interview state Yes
Obs., (R sqaured) 1418, (0.10) Obs., (R sqaured) 1418, (0.09)
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s & above, Skilled
visa are omitted categories for education and visa status. Robust standard
errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
30Table 12: Hours worked per week in main job
Dependent Variable: Hours worked per week
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim -6.032*** -5.812*** Muslim like 1.493 0.749
[2.127] [2.020] [3.276] [2.979]
Post 911 -5.661** -4.872** Post 911 -5.568** -4.724**
[2.484] [2.189] [2.450] [2.163]
Muslim*Post911 5.743 7.041 Muslim like*Post911 4.529 3.889
[5.309] [5.009] [2.854] [2.944]
Ramadan -1.604 -1.778 Ramadan -1.237 -1.689
[1.854] [1.870] [1.902] [1.899]
Muslim*Ramadan -1.055 2.378 Muslimlike*Ramadan -4.966 -1.695
[8.755] [8.764] [5.401] [5.874]
Female -8.459*** -7.453*** Female -8.330*** -7.386***
[0.810] [0.824] [0.808] [0.824]
Age -0.044 -0.020 Age -0.041 -0.017
[0.072] [0.070] [0.074] [0.071]
Speak English well -4.863** -4.617** Speak English well -4.959** -4.719**
[2.293] [2.105] [2.281] [2.107]
Principal applicant 0.447 -0.289 Principal applicant 0.359 -0.307
[1.060] [1.068] [1.056] [1.068]
MU spouse in hhld -2.370 -2.340* MU spouse in hhld -2.503* -2.413*
[1.457] [1.412] [1.471] [1.424]
Kids -1.278*** -1.298*** Kids -1.259*** -1.302***
[0.435] [0.429] [0.446] [0.440]
Months in Australia 0.287 0.308 Months in Australia 0.266 0.287
[0.323] [0.309] [0.327] [0.313]
Professional Cert. 0.446 0.878 Professional Cert. 0.470 0.907
[1.041] [1.143] [1.036] [1.139]
High School -1.105 0.299 High School -1.616 -0.189
or Less [1.339] [1.260] or Less [1.343] [1.252]
Family visa -3.098*** -1.947 Family visa -3.274*** -2.138*
[1.177] [1.198] [1.184] [1.205]
Humanitarian visa -7.054*** -5.003** Humanitarian visa -7.045*** -5.140**
[2.137] [2.116] [2.181] [2.129]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Quarter of arrival Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes COB groups Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Interview state Yes Yes
Occupation No Yes Occupation No Yes
Obs., (R-squared) 1830, (0.20) 1830, (0.24) Obs., (R-squared) 1830, (0.19) 1830, (0.24)
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s & above, Skilled visa
are omitted categories for education and visa status. Robust standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
31Table 13: Wage Income per week, Ordered Probit MLE
Dependent Variable: Interval Coded Income from Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim -0.253* -0.224* Muslim like 0.236 0.211
[0.137] [0.131] [0.178] [0.164]
Post 911 -0.222** -0.167* Post 911 -0.203* -0.151
[0.110] [0.096] [0.107] [0.093]
Muslim*Post911 -0.084 -0.033 Muslim like*Post911 -0.021 -0.021
[0.315] [0.336] [0.164] [0.165]
Ramadan -0.030 -0.059 Ramadan -0.024 -0.056
[0.090] [0.092] [0.088] [0.090]
Muslim*Ramadan -0.156 0.086 Muslim*Ramadan -0.464** -0.152
[0.329] [0.376] [0.209] [0.240]
Female -0.407*** -0.353*** Female -0.398*** -0.346***
[0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
Age 0.001 -0.000 Age 0.001 0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Speak English well 0.010 0.020 Speak English well 0.013 0.024
[0.086] [0.078] [0.086] [0.078]
Principal applicant 0.098* -0.022 Principal applicant 0.089 -0.027
[0.058] [0.056] [0.058] [0.056]
MU spouse in hhld -0.050 -0.001 MU spouse in hhld -0.058 -0.006
[0.065] [0.062] [0.066] [0.062]
Kids -0.026 -0.048** Kids -0.025 -0.048**
[0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021]
Months in Australia 0.022 0.012 Months in Australia 0.021 0.010
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016]
Professional Cert. -0.317*** -0.185*** Professional Cert. -0.313*** -0.180***
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
High School or Less -0.351*** -0.199*** High School or Less -0.370*** -0.217***
[0.063] [0.061] [0.063] [0.061]
Family visa -0.209*** -0.033 Family visa -0.219*** -0.041
[0.066] [0.059] [0.066] [0.059]
Humanitarian visa -0.499*** -0.311*** Humanitarian visa -0.480*** -0.297***
[0.110] [0.106] [0.111] [0.105]
Quarter of arrival Yes Yes Quarter of arrival Yes Yes
COB groups Yes Yes COB groups Yes Yes
Interview state Yes Yes Interview state Yes Yes
Occupation No Yes Occupation No Yes
Observations 1736 1660 Observations 1736 1660
Used weights that correct for between wave attrition. Bachelor￿ s & above, Skilled visa
are omitted categories for education and visa status. Robust standard errors in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
32Table 14: Attrition Indicators (PA only)1
Full sample Muslim Non-Muslim Muslim-like Non-Muslim-like
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interviewed in wave2 85.86 85.92 85.86 92.57 83.83
Unable to track 4.26 6.87 3.89 3.63 4.45
Refused 3.2 1.84 3.39 0.97 3.88
Overseas temporarily 3.22 2.23 3.35 1.18 3.83
Overseas permanently 1.67 1.58 1.68 0.83 1.92
Australia-out of scope2 0.72 0.09 0.81 0.05 0.92
Other 1.08 1.48 1.02 0.78 1.17
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sample size 3124 367 2757 691 2433
1 Used weights that do not correct for attrition.
2 Living in a non-urban area, too distant to be interviewed.
Table 15: Religious identity by survey period1
wave2 wave1
Pre 9/11 Post 9/11 Pre Aug/16 Post Aug/16
Non-Muslim 0.65 0.23 Non-Muslim 0.62 0.26
Muslim 0.09 0.02 Muslim 0.09 0.03
wave2 wave1
Pre 9/11 Post 9/11 Pre Aug/16 Post Aug/16
Non-Muslim-like 0.55 0.20 Non-Muslim-like 0.54 0.23
Muslim-like 0.20 0.06 Muslim-like 0.17 0.06
1 Used weights that do not correct for attrition.
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